Monday, 16 May 2016

CPR Quick Reference Guide

Part 1- Over riding objective
Part 2-6 General Rules for parties & ADR.

Part 7-20 - Preaction protocol (starting a claim)
  • Part 7 and Part 8 explain how to start a case by filing a claim form and that certain claims require different forms.
  • Parts 9-11 explain how the defendant will need to respond to the claim form.
  • Part 12 deals with default judgments — this is where the defence has failed to file an acknowledgment of service; or has failed to file a defence.
  • Part 13 deals with setting aside default judgments.
  • Part 14 deals with admissions (e.g., of liability, guilt, etc).
  • Part 15 explains how the defendant should file and serve a defence (if applicable) and how the claimant should file and serve a response.
  • Part 16 explains the rules governing the “statements of case”, which includes the claim form, the particulars of claim, the defence and maybe a reply.
  • Part 17 explains how to correct mistakes made with documents in the statements of case.
  • If either party wants to make a request for further information they must follow the rules set out in Part 18.
  • Part 19 explains when and how you can bring additional parties into the case.
  • Part 20 deals with counterclaims (additional claims against each party). 

  • Parts 21-22: Litigating the case
    Part 21 provides general information about children and protected parties.
    Part 22 deals with the statement of truth and lists the documents that must contain a statement of truth when filed with the Court.
    • Part 23 deals with general rules about how and when to file applications for a court order.
    • Part 24 deals with summary judgment, this is where a party asks the judge to make a decision where they believe the other party has not has no real prospect of succeeding on or defending the claim or issue, and there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial.
    • Part 25 provides information on interim decisions and how to secure your costs.

  • Parts 26-30: Allocation to a Track

  • Part 26 deals with how the case will be managed. Your case will be allocated to one of three ‘tracks’. Each track has a distinct set of procedural rules and timetables to govern a case. Allocation to a particular track depends on the case’s financial value (i.e., how much you or your opponent claim in damages).
  • The small claims track (Part 27) is for claims with a financial value of not more than 5,000. The procedure is intended to be fast, cheap and informal.
  • The fast track (Part 28) is for claims not falling within the small claims track and with a financial value of not more than 15,000.
  • The multi track (Part 29) is for claims of greater value (over 15,000) or which are considered complex.
  • Part 30 deals with how to transfer your case to a different track.

  • Part 31-35: Evidence

  • Part 31 explains how and when information should be disclosed to the other side, and what information is protected (i.e., does not need to be disclosed).
  • Part 32-33 explains how the court controls evidence and other miscellaneous information.
  • Part 34 explains how to summon witnesses and carry out depositions.
  • Part 35 explains the rules surrounding expert witnesses.
  • Part 36 Offers of settlement 
  • Part 37 explains how to make payments into court.
  • Part 38 governs how to discontinue a case and the consequences of taking this action.
  • Part 39- 40: Hearing and judgment
    • Part 39 explains rules as regards to timetables and court bundles.
    • Part 40 deals with judgments and court orders.

    Parts 43-79: Post-judgment (key parts only)
    Parts 43-48 provide lots of information about costs, including the amount you hope to receive from the other side for your legal costs if you win, or what you have to pay if you lose.
    • CPR 52 deals with the appeals process (i.e., if a party disagrees with a decision)..
    • CPR 70-79 provides information on different methods of enforcing a judgment.

Wednesday, 11 May 2016

10% Increase in General Damages by Joanna Hastie and Helen Rutherford

Background to the Increase
The 10% increase in general damages is one of the key elements of the Jackson Reforms, which aim to rectify disproportionate costs in civil litigation.
Those behind the reforms felt that escalating costs had come to be at the forefront of decision-making in civil litigation, to the detriment of fairness and access to justice considerations. Consequently, the reforms concluded that the proper course was to abolish recoverability of success fees and after the event (ATE) insurance premiums.
Thus, the 10% increase in general damages was introduced to assist Claimants in meeting additional risks and costs arising from the introduction of such measures.
Implementation
Some of the key reforms recommended by The Jackson Report, such as the abolition of conditional fee agreement (CFA) success fees and ATE premium recovery, are encapsulated in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders (‘LASPO’) Act 2012 which came into force at the beginning of April 2013. 
However, the 10% increase in general damages did not appear on the face of this Bill. The government held firm that this matter was for the judiciary.
Simmons v Castle
Consequently, the 10% increase in general damages was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Simmons v Castle [2012] EWCA Civ 1039. The original judgment in this case was given in July of last year – this stated that general damages will increase by 10 per cent where judgment is given after 1 April 2013 – whether or not a CFA is in place and irrespective of when the agreement was signed.
That original decision was widely criticised, both for the manner in which it came about, without giving affected parties the opportunity to make submissions, and the uncertainty that it created:
Litigants were left not knowing how the courts would treat Part 36 offers that would potentially only be beaten by virtue of the 10% increase. Others argued that the decision would be unfair in that Claimants who had entered into CFAs pre April 2013 would still be able to recover success fees AND would now also have the windfall of the 10% increase.
Consequently, following an application of the Association of British Insurers (ABI), the Court heard arguments from the ABI, Association of Personal Injury Lawyers (APIL) and the Bar and subsequently handed down a revised decision of the Simmons judgment in October 2012
Revision of Simmons
In this revision the Court stated as follows:
“20. Accordingly, we take this opportunity to declare that, with effect from 1 April 2013, the proper level of general damages in all civil claims for (i) pain and suffering, (ii) loss of amenity, (iii) physical inconvenience and discomfort, (iv) social discredit, (v) mental distress, or (vi) loss of society of relatives, will be 10% higher than previously, unless the claimant falls within section 44(6) of LASPO. It therefore follows that, if the action now under appeal had been the subject of a judgment after 1 April 2013, then (unless the claimant had entered into a CFA before that date) the proper award of general damages would be 10% higher than that agreed in this case, namely £22,000 rather than £20,000”.
In effect this revision means that the Court broadly accepted the ABI’s submissions and held that the 10% increase in cases where judgment is given after 1 April 2013, should not apply to claimants who fall within the ambit of section 44(6) of LASPO. Therefore, claimants who have already entered into a CFA or CCFA before 1 April 2013 and will be able to recover a success fee from the defendants, will not be eligible for the 10% increase in general damages.

original article: http://www.zenithchambers.co.uk/site/the_jackson_corner/articles/10_percent_increase_in_general_damages.html 

A New Approach to Basic Hire Rates: Karl Stevens v Equity Syndicate Management Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 93 by Steven Hogarth

Introduction
In arguably the most important decision on the calculation of the basic hire rate (BHR) in credit hire litigation since Bent v Highways and Utilities Construction (No. 2) [2011] EWCA Civ 1384, the Court of Appeal has provided a new, simple and Defendant-friendly method for the calculation of BHR. The decision is likely to change fundamentally the way in which credit hire claims are fought.

The Facts
On 10 February 2011, the Claimant’s Audi A4 S Line Tdi 140 was struck by the Defendant’s insured. Liability was admitted. The Claimant entered into a credit hire agreement with Accident Exchange Ltd (‘AEL’) for a period of 28 days. The rate was £140 per day in addition to an excess waiver fee of £22.50 per day and windscreen cover of £3.00 per day. The total rate was therefore £162.50, exclusive of VAT.
At first instance, the Recorder awarded a hire rate based on an average of the rates quoted by four mainstream hire companies for vehicles in the relevant group.

The First Appeal
The First Appeal in this case was heard by Burnett J (as he then was), and was reported as [2014] EWHC 689 (QB), [2014] RTR 34.
Much of the Judge’s reasoning was based upon the following passage from Lord Hoffman’s speech in Dimond v Lovell [2002] 1 AC 384 at 403G:
“How does one estimate the value of these additional benefits that Mrs Dimond obtains? It seems to me that prima facie their value is represented by the difference between what she was willing to pay 1st Automotive and what she would have been willing to pay an ordinary car hire company for the use of a car. As the judge said, 1st Automotive charged more because they offered more. The difference represents the value of the additional services which they provided.”
Referring to that test, Burnett J provided practical advice on identifying the BHR(at [29]):
“… the search must be for the figure which the claimant was willing to pay [to use Lord Hoffmann's formulation] on the basis that he had in fact gone into the ordinary car hire market to find a temporary replacement for his vehicle. In doing that the evidence of a claimant that he would be disinclined to spend more than necessary on a car would be relevant. There might be evidence of how the claimant has sourced hire cars in different contexts. Some might be fortunate to have access to discounted rates through membership of motoring or professional bodies. As was recognised in Burdis a claimant hiring a vehicle to replace one damaged by a tortfeasor would be under a duty to take reasonable steps to mitigate his loss. That does not mean that a claimant would be expected to telephone every last car hire provider in the locality to seek details of various deals that might be available. But the reality today is that almost anybody seeking to hire a vehicle in any particular locality would be likely to investigate the market by doing a simple comparative search on the internet. The full panoply of different hire rates available to the credit hire industry through specialist websites (and regularly produced in credit hire litigation) would not be available to an ordinary driver, but one way or another it is not difficult for anyone wishing to hire a car to discover the rates offered by the major hire companies. Cheapest is not necessarily best and for all sorts of reasons anyone may reasonably choose to hire from a company that is not the cheapest available.” (emphasis added)
The test was based on an assessment of what a particular claimant would have been willing to pay. In practice, this required counsel to ask hypothetical questions to a usually mystified Claimant on what he would have done had he gone into the ordinary hire market. The Court of Appeal’s new approach indicates a shift from a subjective to an objective approach, and will remove the need for such counterfactual questioning by Counsel.

The Second Appeal
The Claimant appealed the judgment of Burnett J, raising the following arguments:
(a) The exercise of finding a basic hire rate is an objective one and cannot depend on what a particular claimant would have been willing to pay;
(b) The law has moved on since Lord Hoffman’s speech in Dimond v Lovell, and Burnett J paid too little attention to Burdis v Livsey [2002] EWCA Civ 510, and Bent (No. 2);
(c) As the burden of proving a difference between the credit hire rate and BHR rests on the defendant, and as some of the basic rates in evidence were higher than the credit hire rate, the Judge was incorrect to find that the credit hire company charged an additional amount in respect of irrecoverable benefits.
Giving the only reasoned judgment (with which Floyd and Jackson LJJ agreed), Kitchen LJ set out the legal background in detail and gave the following judgment:
“[34] … I do not understand Lord Hoffman to have been saying that it was necessary to consider what Mrs Dimond would herself have been prepared to pay. The attitude of the driver who is not at fault must be irrelevant to the analysis. For example, it may be that, as in the present case, the person would never have hired at all. The analysis it, as Aikens LJ said in Pattni, an objective one and it is to determine what the BHR would have been for a reasonable person in the position of the claimant to hire a car of the kind actually hired on credit.
[35] Here I think one finds the answer to the questions I have posed. The rates quoted by companies for the basic hire of a vehicle of the kind actually hired by the claimant on credit hire terms may vary. No doubt some are offered on very favourable terms. So also those at the top of the range may reflect particular market conditions which allow some companies to charge more than others. But it seems to me reasonable to suppose that the lowest reasonable rate quoted by a mainstream supplier for the hire of such a vehicle to a person such as the claimant is a reasonable approximation to the BHR. This is likely to be a fair market rate for the basic hire of a vehicle of that kind without any of the additional services provided to the claimant under the terms of the credit hire agreement.
[36] It follows that a judge faced with a range of hire rates should try to identify the rate or rates for the hire, in the claimant’s geographical area, of the type of car actually hired by the claimant on credit hire terms. If that exercise yields a single rate then that rate is likely to be a reasonable approximation for the BHR. If, on the other hand, it yields a range of rates then a reasonable estimate of the BHR may be obtained by identifying the lowest reasonable rate quoted by a mainstream supplier or, if there is no mainstream supplier, by a local reputable supplier.” (emphasis added)
Therefore, the Court of Appeal found that although Burnett J erred in his reasoning (by failing to apply an objective approach), the result on the facts of the case was sound. The appeal was dismissed.

Comment
The approach set out by Kitchen LJ is new and highly favourable for defendants. It provides sensible and straightforward guidance on the issue of the determination of the BHR. It appears that all defendants need do is survey evidence from mainstream suppliers (or if there are none, local reputable suppliers) for the type of care hired and in the claimant’s geographical area. The applicable rate will then automatically be the lowest reasonable rate.
What this means for defendants is that so long as they source well-prepared rates reports, containing all the relevant terms and conditions, excess waiver cover, and where appropriate, daily rates from major hire companies for cars of the appropriate type, then such evidence is likely to ensure that the Court awards only the lowest reasonable rate. Likewise, in cases such as Equity, where AEL attempts to rely on a report generated by a large database of rates, the evidence may well prove to be extremely helpful to defendants.



This article has just been published on the PI Brief Update Law Journal.

Monday, 5 December 2011

RTA PI Claims Portal

The system supports the RTA PI Claims reforms process for low value personal injury claims (£1,000 - £10,000) agreed by Claimant and Defendant stakeholders with the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) by providing a secure medium for the electronic transfer between Claimant Representatives and Defendant Insurer/Compensators of the information necessary to process claims by individuals for personal injury following a road traffic accident.

The system has been designed in partnership with Claimant and Defendant stakeholders to take account of the internal working practices of both, whilst remaining fully compliant with the agreed reform protocols. It manages the communications throughout the stages defined by the protocols, validates the data defined as mandatory is fully completed, monitors the agreed times and provides reminders to avoid these periods being exceeded.

Q: Why were the PI reforms introduced in April 2010?

A: The reforms were introduced to streamline the current compensation system by speeding up the process of establishing liability and finalising payment of low cost RTA injury claims. Claimant lawyers now submit agreed information and insurers/compensators responding within specific time periods.

Q: Do the reforms apply to all PI claims?

A: The new process does apply to low cost personal injury claims from accidents that occurred on and after 30 April 2010 in England and Wales valued between £1,000 - £10,000 in damages – the majority of all motor personal injury claims affecting in the region of 500,000 claimants.

Q: Will the majority of motor claims go through the process?

A: It is anticipated the majority of motor claims will fall into the category covered by the new process. It is too early to judge how many of these will fall out of the process due to liability disputes. The technology system has the capacity and scalability to deal with the anticipated volume of claims covered by the new process.

Q: How long did it take to resolve low value RTA claims and how much did it cost?

A: Previously, it took several months to establish liability if the insurer/compensator has to request further information. Additional work by either side increases both legal and insurer/compensator handling costs. Streamlining the flow of agreed information on both liability and quantum between parties reduces the operational costs experienced and will enable the insurer/compensator to agree settlement more quickly.

Q: How does the new process differ from the previous RTA PI claims procedure?

A: The new process requires the use of standardised information passed between claimant lawyers and insurers through a secure electronic Portal, within specific time frames, which enables key decisions to be communicated more quickly and reduces duplication.

Q: How is the new process structured?

A: There are two definitive key stages involved in the new process with an optional third stage in the event of disagreement on quantum:

Stage One: The claimant’s solicitor completes the claim notification form and sends it to the insurer, who may admit or deny liability within 15 working days. There is a £400 fixed fee.

Stage Two: Where liability is admitted, the claimant solicitor completes and sends a Settlement Pack to the insurer/compensator. The insurer/ compensator has 15 working days to accept or a further 20 working days to negotiate via counter offers. There is an £800 fixed fee attached to this stage.

Medical evidence is gathered between stages 1 & 2 – there is no set time as medical reports must reflect the claimant’s injuries and recovery.

Stage Three: Comes into effect only when the relevant parties cannot agree a settlement figure, the claim then proceeds to a quantum hearing. Fixed costs of £250 for a paper hearing or £500 for an oral hearing will be met and there is no time limit involved.

Sunday, 28 November 2010

A Successful Claim for Credit Hire

Guidance on making a successful credit hire claim was laid out in Clark v Ardington, Lagden v O'Conner.
  1. Establish there is a valid, enforceable credit hire agreement that complies with the Consumer Credit (Exempt Agreements) Order 1989 (requiring the debt to be paid in no more than four installments in less than 12 months from the date of the agreement).
  2. Show the Claimant was impecuniose (that he had no choice but to use a credit hire). The test being whether the Claimant had sufficient funds available without exposing himself and his family to greater loss or an unreasonable burden.
  3. Mitigate their losses: it is paramount that a Claimant must take reasonable steps to mitigate their loss. There had to be a genuine NEED for a replacement vehicle and no offer of a courtesy car was made by the insurer. Although a claimant is not obliged to use their own insurance to benefit the claimant.

Wednesday, 24 November 2010

Road Traffic Accidents: Low Velocity Impact Claims

Low velocity impact (LVI) claims are claims for damages for injuries sustained in a road traffic accident in which the defendant (whilst often admitting negligently having caused the collision) asserts that the speed of impact was so low that the claimant cannot have sustained the injury complained of. Such a defence is often, but not always, accompanied by a plea of fraud – the claimant has made it up.

LVI claims most often involve whiplash injuries to the spine, usually the neck. They are mostly low value claims relating to relatively minor symptoms that resolve over a matter of weeks or months. The value of the claims are invariably such that they fall within the bracket to which, in terms of value, allocation to the fast-track is appropriate.

The fundamental premise of the LVI defence is that there is level of physical force upon a vehicle’s occupant below which no injury can be sustained by the occupant. This claimed threshold for injury is often calculated as between 3 or 5 mph ÄV.

Unlike in laboratory conditions, the actual speed of the impact in which the claimant was injured will rarely if ever be known with any accuracy. Witnesses’ descriptions of speed are notoriously unreliable. Therefore even if it were the case that an impact speed of less than x mph simply could not flex a human spine sufficient to inflict anything other than momentary symptoms, it will not often be the case that the evidence will be such as to compel the court to find that the impact speed was indeed less than x mph.

Vehicle damage is unlikely to be a reliable indicator of impact speed as parts of different cars absorb or transmit force differently to others. There will rarely be clear and detailed evidence as to the precise nature and extent of vehicle damage. Sometimes there will be no, or no obvious, damage, especially in many modern vehicles with absorbent bumper bars beneath the outer bumper. “Vehicle damage reports” are insufficient. They are prepared by insurance assessors simply enquiring into whether any damage is broadly consistent with the account given and whether the likely cost of repair exceeds the value of the vehicle. They do not involve an inspection intended to detect evidence indicative of impact speed. Repair estimates and bills are equally insufficient. Photographs mostly depict only superficial damage and cannot indicate the extent to which force has been transferred to the occupant.

In Armstrong v First York [2005] EWCA Civ 277, the defendant alleged that the impact force involved had not been enough to cause the claimants any injury and therefore their claims to have been injured were fraudulent. The claim was accordingly allocated to the multi-track and a jointly instructed forensic engineer permitted to give evidence. He concluded that the impact was insufficient to cause any injury to the claimants. However, the trial judge(5) unreservedly accepted the claimants as truthful witnesses but also found that the expert’s evidence was logical, consistent and without any apparent error. The judge relied upon the dicta of the Court of Appeal in Cooper Payan Ltd v Southampton Container Terminal Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 1223 that:
There is no rule of law or practice in such a situation requiring the judge to favour oraccept the evidence of the expert or the evidence of a witness of fact. The judge mustconsider whether he can reconcile the evidence of the expert witness with that of the witness of fact. If he cannot do so, he must consider whether there may be an explanation for the conflict of evidence or for a possible error by either witness, and in the light of all the circumstances make a considered choice which evidence to accept. The circumstances may be such as to require the judge to reach only one conclusion.


The judge found that the claimants’evidence was to be accepted and that the engineer’s evidence involved “some error which has not been detected by this court and to which the court cannot point. The Defendant appealed on the basis that, in line with Flannery v Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 377, it was not open to a judge to reject the evidence of an expert without giving clear reasons why. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as the judge had indeed given a reason for rejecting the expert’s evidence namely that it was inconsistent with that of the claimant’s whose evidence he preferred as he was entitled to.

In effect by basing their case on the impossibility of injury and thus alleging “fraud”, the defendant’s insurers had switched the burden of proof onto themselves. Defendants now no longer allege that injury was impossible and therefore the claim is fraud. Rather, as entitled (see Kearsley below), they now allege that injury was so improbable that the claimant simply cannot establish, on the balance of probabilities, the injury claimed.

Thursday, 11 March 2010

Land Law -> A Valid Tenancy

There are three key legal requirements for a tenancy to be created, often known as the “Three Ps”:

· Tenancy created in a proper manner,

· for a stated period of time,

· granting exclusive possession.

Proper manner

There are certain requirements for a tenancy agreement to be considered to be created in a proper manner:

· Identifiable parties, i.e. an identifiable landlord and tenant.

· Identifiable premises, i.e. an identifiable full address for the premises being let, which should include the postcode for the avoidance of doubt.

In law tenancy agreements for a duration of less than three years can be created either in writing or verbally – however, we strongly advise against verbal contracts, since the terms agreed can be difficult to prove at a later date.

In the unlikely event that your tenancy is for a term of more than three years it will need to be created by Deed – this is a technical process and will involve a solicitor, so if you find yourself in this situation, get advice. Note that this does not include shorter contracts that are later renewed past three years – they can still be created by normal contracts.

Period of Time

A tenancy agreement must state the maximum or minimum length of time it is for, and this can be stated either as fixed term or periodic. See the information on fixed term or periodic contracts for details of the differences.

Exclusive Possession

If Exclusive Possession is not granted a Tenancy cannot be created, only a License. This is likely to be the case, for example, with Home Stay accommodation, where you rent a room in a landlord’s own home. Your rights as a Licensee will be substantially different to those of a tenant, so make sure you get advice beforehand.